

Socio-Political Power Structure and Indigenous Politics in Colonial District Multan (1849-1901)

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Abstract

This research treats the initial period of colonial rule in Multan tracing the factors that led the British to rely on the landed elite for support, and enter into the bargain between the two actors that drove subsequent power politics. How this bargain in the shape of rewards and patronage disturbed the balance of power and innate sense of competition began to exist among the local allies and the indirect willingness was to serve more and be rewarded more? This is demonstrated through the war services of Qureshies and Gillanies, the dominant political elites. The relationship between the two was one of mutual benefit, with the British using their landed allies to ensure the maintenance of order and effective economic accumulation in exchange for state patronage. Over a century and a half later, the politics of Pakistani Punjab continues to be dominated by landowning politicians as Pirs and Jagirdars despite significant societal changes that could have potentially eroded their power. Addressing the issues, the research aims at to develop deductive method for assessing its historic importance and analyze the region as case studies. This research is based on original unpublished official reports from British Indian Library London, Punjab Civil Secretariat Lahore

Key words: Multan, Socio-political, Power, Local Politics, Colonial annexation

Socio- Political Power Structure of the Region

Colonial administrative structure firmly established within a few years after annexation, the immediate visible change was reformation of the power structure of land. ¹ As Mustafa Kamal Pasha described that the British saw a social revolution in land relations as the only prerequisite for durable state. They viewed the old *Jagirdars* and the other privileged groups of ancient regime as guardians of status quo.² For this purpose, they looked for local clients in the form of *Jagirdars*; those *Jagirdars* were also *Pirs* of the shrines, so they had their influence in masses not politically but religiously. Those shrines of the *Pirs* were also the centre of socio-economic transition. Political or religious elites served as the agents of social change and active partners in both the wars in 1849 to annex the region or in the war of 1857 to strengthen them.

Based on the simple principle of reward for collaboration and punishment for resistance, the British policy produced a class of land owners who would dominate politics in Multan for many generations: for example the *Pir* and *Pathan* families who had been rewarded in the campaign of 1849 proved valueless for the Company Raj. Edwards' suggestions created conflict in Board of Administration over *Jgir* policy. With the approval of Governor-General in November 1849, Faujdar Khan received *Jagir* of 4000 Rs., Gulam Serwer Khan, Garden in Shujabad tehsil, Gulam Kasim Khan, Gulam Mustafa Khan and Sadiq Muhammad Khan were granted Gardens in Multan city.³

Anyhow, campaign of Multan in fact was a power game between Hebert Edwardes and Multani Muslim elites. Muslims had ruled Multan before 1818 Sikh Government; these were known as *Multani Pathans*. Edwardes had realised the importance of *Multani Pathans* as British allies and he succeeded in winning their loyalties through oral guarantee to pay them for their war time services. *Pathans* were ready to help Edwardes so that they could retain their jobs in the army and restore their lands after the change in the government.

When rebellion erupted in Multan, Edwardes contacted Faujdar Khan, a trusted Lieutenant of his army and relative of many

influential officers of the Diwan's force. Edwardes decided to take his services and send him as ambassador to the Diwan for discussion. Faujdar Khan too understood the importance of the time, and felt that Company could help him and his family in regaining the position authorities lost 30 years ago.

In early 1848, Mulraj himself sent one of his senior officers Ghulam Mustafa Khakwani to Edwardes to convey that he wanted to transfer power peacefully. On 8th May, Gulam Mustafa Khakwani and Faujdar Khan met at the east bank of Sindh River where Khakwani told Edwardes that *Pathans* were ready to leave Mulraj if Edwardes would give back all their lands and property with their jobs that were taken by the Mulraj. Edwardes gave them his hand written guarantee for their lives, property and honour.⁴

This was how the Muslim leadership of Multan became ready to give support Edwards. If the sword was the source of power for armed class, we cannot deny the importance of *Pirs* and *Sajjada Nashins* and their influence on social sector. From all of them, Shah Mahmood Qureshi was most prominent because he was the *Sajjada Nashin* of Bahudin Zakria, who was the most famous in Multan, Sindh, Baluchistan and Punjab. Followers from Kharasan, Afghanistan and Hindustan came to his tomb with offerings. With Shah Mahmood, there were two other important families of Multan - Gillani and Gardezi, helped Edwardes against Mulraj. Now the question is why Muslims of Multan were ready to support Colonial officers? We cannot understand the entire situation without analysing prevailing circumstances with special reference to their relationship with Hindus. Hindus became dominant over Muslims in the fields of politics and economics during the last 30 years of Sikh rule. Hindu traders and bankers took many benefits from the peaceful period of Sikh rule.

In Afghan period, Shikarpur and Sindh were trading and banking centres where Hindus were the dominant business class. Multan city was the main exporter of fine silk and textile cotton while Shikapur and Calcutta were associated with banking networking. This commerce network was very important for those traders who were exchanging money with

gold and silver coins. With the start of Sikh rule, Hindu traders from Shikarpur were used to station at Multan, ⁵ where they became very powerful not only politically but economically as well. For Muslims, it was period of decline. In 1831, when Burnes came in Multan he wrote in his travelogue ... "So high a Mahomaden Supremacy, there is now no public numaz, the true believer dare not fit his voice in public. The Eieds and Moherrum pass without the usual observances; the Allah ho Akbar of priest is never heard, the mosques are yet frequented, but the pious are reduced to offering up their orisons in silence."⁶

These were the circumstances when Muslim political and religious elites decided to throw in their lot with the Colonial officers. After annexation of Multan, the East India Company decided to give rewards for their war allies. Sarfaraz Khan Sadozai secretly worked for the British during the war. Sarfraz Khan was the only living son of ex Afghan ruler Muzafar Khan who had died during the war of Sikh annexation. Sikh government gave him life time pension but forced him to remain under their observation.⁷ In 1849, Sarfraz Khan claimed to the Board of Administration, because he was the chief of his tribe. The Board declared him to be a life time pension holder for his family. Many *Pathan* allies got rewards for their war time services but the Board was especially generous with Sarfraz Khan.⁸ In the irregular army of Herbert Edwardes, local soldiers, like Faujdar Khan, Gulam Sarwar Khan Khakwani, Sadiq Muhammad Khan Badozai and Gulam Qasim Khan Alizai were appointed as regular servants.⁹

After generously distributing the rewards, the East India Company secured not only their raj but also took the oath of faith for future assistance. The Company finished their traditional type of rule because they did not need their services. Now they wanted to rule over the people with their new ruling policies. According to John Lawrence, "The soldiers long for native rule. He is not fit or inclined for our service. His trade is gone; he is too old or lazy to lean a new one. Crowds of irregular horses and footmen are thrown out of employment and swell the number of the discontented."¹⁰ *Pirs* and *Pathans* got much from the East India Company for their war time

services. In this respect Shah Mahmood got more than others. However, the government refused to compensate the loss of damage of shrines of Bahaudin Zakria due to war.”¹¹

Post 1857 War Political Settlement

The next test of the Muslim elites' faithfulness was the war of 1857. At that time there were two platoons in Multan that were suspected by the British. They took back all the arms from them. Yet 1200 men from 69th regiment rebelled. At the early time of crisis with the help of large Bengal Army, Commissioner Hamilton and Major Chamberlain controlled the situation.¹² The *Pir* and *Pathan* families supported in 1848 did all again to strengthen the Raj. While the local inhabitants and agriculturalists were concerned the situation was apparently seemed calm. They wanted to follow their leader's footsteps. The *Pir* and *Pathan* were confident that when the Raj became stable, they would be rewarded for their loyalties. Mukhdum Shah Mahmud Qureshi, Gulam Mustafa Khan Khawani and Sadiq Muhammad Khan Badozai were the real beneficiaries of the war time services. They were awarded life time *jagirs*, gardens in Multan city, dresses of honor and cash prizes.¹³ The British, however, were able to crush the rebellion, thanks to the help of their local landlord allies. Multan was thereafter seen as a bastion of Colonial strength in the region.

After the war, the collaboration between *Pir* and *Pathan* families of Multan and British Government not only sustained but extended. According to Hamilton, “The proposed grants were necessary not only to requite past services but to maintain in positions of eminence families whose representatives have in times of danger proved loyalty and fidelity and to whom we may in future look for support.”¹⁴

Colonial Management and Conception of Authority

In a region like Multan, land was an essential factor symbolizing power and authority.¹⁵ It gave a feudal economic and social privilege over the rest of the society.¹⁶ Muslim society was based on tribal kinship bonds. The Colonial administrator acknowledged the social and political importance of the tribal and kinship groups and strengthened and promoted

them further.¹⁷ Multani society was essentially rural in character and peasants were the backbone of the rural economy. It was organized along tribal and *biradari* kinship lines. These very structures of organization shaped the Punjabi conception of authority. The headman of *biradari*, who was elected by the notable *biradari* members, was the key element of this social fabric. Agricultural land, being a means of livelihood as well as a status symbol, was the most precious asset for them.

Land grants to them, therefore, served on both counts. So land grants not only strengthened their conception of a benevolent colonial authority but were also commensurate with their desire of land. .¹⁸ By the mid-19th century, the Colonial policy had created a class of rural leaders who were close to the management, and acted as intermediaries between the ruler and the ruled. This class played key role in maintaining Imperial control over India.¹⁹ They were integrated in the colonial hierarchy as honorary magistrates, members of district boards and legislative councils.

In the 1860, the Punjab government implemented a new policy for district administration. For this, three new bureaucratic positions were created: Honorary Magistrate, Honorary Police Officer and *Zaildar*. These people were assigned various duties, primarily the investigation of revenue free holdings. The most important group among the revenue holders was that of the *Jagirdars*. During the Sikh period, roughly 66% of the land in Multan district was held in *Jagirs*. However, *Jagir* holdings were reduced to about 20% of the total district area following the first regular land revenue settlement which was sanctioned in 1860. *Jagir* holdings were further reduced in 1870 when the second settlement in the district was completed. So, the revenue free holdings in Multan district were substantially reduced within the first twenty one years of the British rule. The British government improved the position of the *Jagirdars* in the late 1850s to reward their loyalty during the rebellion of 1857, and *Jagirs* and pensions were generously granted to various *Jagirdars* and particularly to the influential people²⁰ The British granted considerable autonomy to the villages through the co-option of influential men ; the co-option procedure was initiated through *Zaildars*.²¹

Zaildari system was introduced in Multan district during the second regular settlement (1873-1880).²² A total of 79 *Zaildars* were appointed: two of them e for police administration and 79 for the newer common functions. In many cases, however, the appointment of *Zaildars* was nothing more than a paper exercise.²³ Magistrates, however, were more helpful and satisfactory as collaborators for colonial rule.²⁴ A provincial Government enquiry in became the reason for the introduction of Honorary Magistracy in district Multan. However it was somewhat later when actual appointments were made. ²⁵ In 1877 four Honorary Magistrates were appointed for Multan city, invested with the powers of a third class magistrate. Two more honorary magistrates were appointed in 1879.²⁶ A chief headman was elected in every village through the votes of the proprietary bodies, subject to the sanction of deputy commissioner. ²⁷ They were also accountable for revenue collection and were bound to assist in the prevention and detection of the crime. A chief headman was elected in every village through the votes of the proprietary bodies, subject to the sanction of deputy commissioner. .

The headmen were appointed on the basis of their loyalty and skills, and were under the *Zaildars*. Usually, these *Zaildars* were the leaders of the local “tribes” and “clans”, and had shows their unquestionable loyalty to the British. The early practice in the selection of *Zaildars* called for elections among the *Zails* headman, whose vote though not binding was intended to guide the choice.²⁸ *Zaidars* were the most essential segment of the local level management and their involvement in government was of much importance.²⁹

District Management and Colonial Multan

The *Zaildari* system was an attempt to link rural masses with the district management through prominent men from dominant families. ³⁰ These *Zaildar* families emerged with considerable influence and gained the position to claim the leadership of the *Zail's* dominant tribes. Though the position of the *Zaildars* was not hereditary, mostly it passed from father to son, and thus this class became very influential. After 1890, the British granted large tracts of land in the canal colonies to enhance the position

of many Punjabi *Zaildars*. Few *Zaildars* became land-lord as influential as the magnates of southern Punjab.³¹ These rural leaders had played increasingly more important role in the district boards and provincial legislature. The Colonial management tried to win the loyalty and goodwill of these influential by bestowing upon them several titles.³² Initially, the attempts were made to encourage the influential men of the town to get involved in addressing the critical issues such as town taxes and municipal funds.

Like *Zaildars* in rural areas, municipal committee members were appointed in the cities. The Municipality of Multan was established in 1867. The composition of the Municipal committee was differed at different times. Between 1885 and 1899, it consisted of 36 members, of whom 24 were elected and 12 were nominated. After 1899, it was composed of 24 members, of whom 16 were elected and 8 were nominated; of the elected members 8 were Muslim and 8 were Hindu. The nominated members comprise 4 Europeans, 3 Muslims, and one Hindu.³³ The management wanted to administrator the district as effectively as possible because the basic purpose of colonial policies was the concerns to maintain law and order and to collect revenue.

In the early years of British rule, many administrators had not trust over existing landed elite particularly old Sikh *jagirdars* of central Punjab whose power they saw as legacy of the rule of Ranjit Singh. It was assumed that *jagirdars* left by Ranjit Singh had no links of “old association” with the village. Then influence was not confined to boundaries of tribally defined *zail* but often transcended limits. These local leaders were linked to administration through *inams* and revenue free grants.³⁴

The local elite had earned power and influence by displaying political loyalty during Sikh War and War of 1857. Their nexus with the Colonial government existed because they shared the prosperity and benefits, the government brought to the rural society. The Colonial administration dispensed large amounts of patronage to landholders in order to secure their alliance.³⁵ Such landlordism produced a culture which maintained a

distinction between different classes of society. The culture widened the difference between commoner and elite.³⁶ The Colonial administration strengthened this difference in the process of redefining tribal leadership, which created factional rivalry as less privileged tribes felt they had been implicitly relegated to secondary status.

If the *jagirdars* were the prop up of rural society, spiritual support was provided by religious figures known as *Pirs* and *Sayids*. The importance of *Pirs* in Multan cannot be overvalued. Every Multani feel honoured to be associated with a particular *Pir*, to whose *mazar* a regular contribution would be made at harvest time. The living *Pirs* were a source of spiritual guidance and inspiration and gave practical advice on disputes. In this way, *Pirs* complemented the *jagirdars* as adjudicators. Indeed *jagirdars* would frequently consult their *Pirs* before exercising authority in difficult or complex cases, while cultivators who had lost *their jagirdars'* good will, or who wanted a favour, might approach the great man through his *Pir*. The *pirs'* and *jagirdars* shared the leadership of Multani society.

At the other end of Multan's social spectrum were Hindu tribes and castes, mainly the *Jat* and *Rajput*, who had converted to Islam. Many were the tribal groups of Sindhi origin that had settled in South-western Punjab, as had the *Siyals* who dominated the territory of the lower Ravi, between Jhang and Multan. Further south, in the bar lands of the Mailsi and Kabirwala Tehsils, Langrial, Hirraj and Singana were the dominant nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes and the *Joyas* on the southern course of the Sutlej. Langha, Thahim and Traggar were present along the Ravi on the Shujabad tehsil. While many of these tribes in the 19th century appeared to have settled in great numbers founding the riverian villages, the tribes inhabiting the bar, although converted to Islam not completed their transition to a settled way of life.³⁷ Therefore, the difference between *hithar* and bar or *riverian* and highlands, largely corresponded to one between settled and nomadic worlds. This pattern remained intact despite Colonial pressure until the second half of 19th century.³⁸

Land Settlement and Structure of Land Ownership

The Colonial annexation of Multan in 1849 was followed by the efforts to restructure land ownership. With the Land Settlement, however, the management did not simply record land rights and revenue, but also tried to alter the local rural structure. One of the prominent outcomes of these efforts was the idea of 'village community'. This policy was being affected through the officials from the North-Western Provinces, where the idea had already been put into practice.³⁹ The application of this policy was partly due to the thinking among Colonial managers that in Multan the common peasants and the big *Zamindars* lacked the necessary spirit to become the back bone of the province, unlike in the eastern and northern districts of the Punjab. According to Edward Maclagan, settlement officer in Multan between 1885 and 1900, the Multani Peasant was:

... more self-centred and, at the same time, less alert and less industrious than the ordinary Punjabi. The Multani peasant lives on a well and not in a large village, he marries a neighbour and not a woman from a distant district. He never enlists, and sees nothing of any district but his own. He has therefore, a distrust of strangers...He has little public spirit, and seldom looks at anyone's interest but his own...The richer man have no idea of spending money on works of public utility...the inhabitant of Multan, though capable of exertion for a time, is, as a rule, easily discouraged. His efforts are by fits and starts; long continued energy is unknown to him; and he has not the instinct of discipline which marks the *Jat* of the central Punjab.⁴⁰

The notion of a village community, therefore, was not just an administrative process planned to develop the revenue sources it was a also method to construct a 'community of interest'. Regardless of the fact that the villages in Multan were nearby only in the riverian areas, at a distance from a few collections of scattered houses in the bar near the wells, the view that the Colonial administration had of the lower Bari *Doab* was that there should have been village communities, and that these should form the basis of the revenue administration in the Multan region.

Village communities in Punjab were defined by Richard Tupper as a group of families bound together by the tie of descent from a common ancestor.⁴¹ Therefore, the people had to be made jointly accountable for the collection of revenue. The land was thus alienated into artificial units, called *mauzah*, to which a joint liability was accredited. However, the presences of these communities in Multan were more a fantasy than a reality due to the environmental characteristics of the region. The Commissioner G.W. Hamilton warned, in 1860, of 'non-existence of village communities and the incoherent nature of the subordinate fiscal division.'⁴² However the Government, while admitting the non-existence of these communities, emphasised the need to create them. There was a logic that the formation of the communities had to be the 'natural' growth of the Multani society. The individualistic stage, at which the rural people of Multan lived, was for some a type of first on the mode of civilization. The Financial Commissioner R.N.Cust in fact wrote that:

...these people are the pioneers of civilization, the squatters in the primeval forest. Gradually however, the ramparts of a municipality will be formed round them; we have now given them a defined village area, and a joint property in the jungle, to the exclusion of others...the ties of fellowship and mutual advantage will draw them together, the law of joint responsibility will bring with it the right of pre-emption. As cultivation, population and wealth extend, these infant communities will develop themselves on one of the Gangetic valley, and the village community has come in to existence.⁴³

However, by trying to classify a region in common property for a community 'to the exclusion of others' in an area where grazing areas were so insufficient that the cattle had to 'wander over wide tracts in search of food'⁴⁴ was not only to go against any verification of the standard of living and ecosystem of the area, but also to bring the risk of creating clash in the society. It was a situation similar to Kamshmiri settings as analysed by Aprana Rao.⁴⁵ Where, ordinary entrance to sources was controlled by the colonial interference.

It is fascinating to note, however, that in the colonial mind, the shrines of the Sufis could become a tool to build 'common identities' in the localities. During the management process with which, in the late 19th century, the colonial management recorded the verification –or continuation – of *jagirs* or *maufi* attached to the shrines, special consideration was given to the social life of every institution. The management tried to measure if the shrines were in fact at the centre of the local villagers' or pastoral tribes' life. This would verify the bent of mind by the management to see the *dargahs* as the focus of local identities,⁴⁶ but would also propose a long term procedure in the direction of the 'secularization' of the shrines under the colonial government.⁴⁷

If the effort to form village communities was not successful, additional attempt to change the rural social structure was made through the claims to revenue-free grants that after annexation were forwarded to the government. Apart from a variety of cases of exemption from the payment of land revenue-known as *jagir* or *maufi*- an auxiliary model of support was *the tirins*. These grants were usually quite old, many of them originating from Mughal *sanads*, and testified to the relevance of pastoralism in the south western Punjab's economy.

Between 1850s and 1880s, the Colonial management had to scrutinize a great number of claims for the confirmation on *tirinis*. The trend was towards decrease of grants. The official reasons were typically the lack of written proof or the possible falsification of the documents by the claimants. Although interviews with witnesses were part of the process, and these often confirmed the claims, little worth was given to them; oral evidence always succumbed to written evidence. For example, in the 1850s, cases were recorded for two Hindu families - entered as 'nomads' – both of whom claimed *tirini* grants for various camels. Both grants, according to the claimants, had been conceded by the former Diwan Sawan Mal (1821-1844), and this was confirmed by the witnesses. Still, both were resumed due to lack of original *sanad*. In another case, the resumption of the grant was made on the basis of the rather strange argument that the grant was 'not in favour of a shrine or temple'. However in this case the pressure of the tribe led the

commissioner to go against his subordinate's view and confirm the grant for the life of the incumbent.⁴⁸

Moreover, in the early 20th century, about 48 % of the region of Multan fell under the grouping of 'uncultivable waste'. In the uplands, according to the official records, land was 'a grazing ground for sheep and a browsing ground for goats and camels.'⁴⁹ In addition, we have sufficient proof to suggest the different sectors of the society tended to maintain pastoralism as a preferred activity. If therefore, pastoralism and breeding were so important in the life of the district, we would argue that the decrease of grazing tax payback by the management to the families and tribes of the district signalled the colonial concern in reducing the admittance to resources for pastoral nomadism in the district, motivating as a replacement for adjusted life and agriculture. In any case, the stability of a 'pastoral spirit' in the temperament of Multani peasants was something about which the Colonial management kept complaining throughout the period under discussion. This complexity faced by the management in enforcing a diverse pattern of economic activity would be part of the background of the large scale irrigation projects of the late 19th and early 20th century. As we have seen, the Multan bar was a high and mostly arid region, which extended from the southern part of the Jhang and Montgomery districts to confluence of the Sutlej and Chenab rivers, south of Multan city. It was a region that was populated mostly by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes judged by the management to be generally 'unreliable' and 'predatory'. The area had not considerably changed despite earlier attempts of artificial irrigation made during the Mughal period.⁵⁰ In the early 18th century, agriculture in Multan was still limited to the fertile *hithar* lands. A partial extension of the agriculture towards the bar occurred many years later under the Nawabs of Multan and Bahawalpur in the mid-18th century, possibly due to the political autonomy enjoyed by the Nawabs with the passage of the independence from the Mughal to the Afghan kingdom.⁵¹

The uncultivated areas were not economically profitable for the management: the land paid little as revenue and the grazing tax paid was considered 'insignificant' by a Colonial officer in the early 19th century. Furthermore, the tribes of the bar were not

useful for the military needs.⁵² This was the main complaint of the management against the Multani inhabitants in general, and at the same time was noticeable and a vital point of dissimilarity between the South-west and the other districts of the Punjab, where the peasants were the backbone of rural economy and army. The only tribes that in the early 19th century were entered for recruitment were *Pathan* tribes, as the Khakwanis and Badozais, with which the Colonial officers had had close links since the 1849 war.⁵³ However, the members of these tribes used to enrol as officers of elite Cavalry and Camel corps, not as infantry troops. The aggression of the management towards the tribes of the bar was expressed clearly during the war of 1857, when Colonial officers feared that the tribes could join the rebellion. According to a colonial officer, 'the predatory clans inhabiting the Bar...from time immemorial had been addicted to robbery and cattle-lifting, and under former Governments had repeatedly broken out in insurrection.' During the war of 1857 some of the chiefs were locked up as de facto hostages by the Deputy Commissioner in Multan, in order to avoid the feared rebellion.⁵⁴

As discussed, colonial criticism was not only against nomadic tribes inhabited in surrounding areas, but in general towards the rural society of Multan, including the *Zamindars*. The peasantry of Multan as well as *Zamindars* possessed large areas of land but colonial managers considered them less efficient than rest of Punjab. On the other hand, some colonial observers admitted the peculiar condition of the frontier region. Malcolm Darling,⁹¹ for example, wrote that in Multan "insecurity dominates everything", insecurity of crop and insecurity of the property held back the poor peasants from investing all their efforts and hard-earned money in agricultural ventures where uncertainty about the profit prevailed". Only persons with strong economic and military means would be able to protect their holdings. The *Jagirdars* were unwilling to accept positions of village headmen because of lesser sense of pride and risk to independence. They would probably assigned greater-power and responsibilities as honorary magistrates, but administration did not had complete trust on them. Authorities preferred to appoint ex-officials and also those *Jagirdars* who

were from the old ruling families like *Pathans* of Multan. They would be high in social rank and stood aloof from the rivalries with each other.

Conclusion

To conclude, within a couple of decades of the Colonial annexation, a number of officers serving in Multan, began to believe that *Jagirdars* who got worse off the competition. They were floundered in a mesh of debt and usurious interest payments. Their estates were broke up and passed to their Hindu creditors. The *Jagirdars* would soon become extinct. In short, the traditional power structure of rural Multan was disintegrated. The prospect of social revolution on such a scale was appalling due to the disintegration of the rural power. If the rural power structure disintegrated, it would take the colonial regime with it the *Jagirdars* were a crucial element in the system of rural intermediaries through whom the Colonial governors governed Multan. Without them little would remain of the local administration.

The period under analysis concluded that the management was far away from troubled that the rapid agricultural indebtedness and land alienation, to be the trend as an example of the survival of the fittest. Economic policies brought effects as the economic and social position of many prominent landed families deteriorated.

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